":hH,dZddlmZddlmZGddeZGddeZGdd eZGd d eZ d Z d Z dZ dZ dZdZdZdZdZej&edeZej*eeeeZdZdZdZdZdZej&edeZej*eeeeZdZdZdZdZdZej&edeZej*eeeeZd Zd!Zd"Zd#Zd$Zej&edeZej*eeeeZd%Zd&Zd'Zd(Zd)Zej&edeZej*eeeeZd*Zd+Zd,Zd-Zd.Zd/Zej&eeeZ ej*e eeeZ!y0)1a Implementation of Elliptic-Curve Digital Signatures. Classes and methods for elliptic-curve signatures: private keys, public keys, signatures, NIST prime-modulus curves with modulus lengths of 192, 224, 256, 384, and 521 bits. Example: # (In real-life applications, you would probably want to # protect against defects in SystemRandom.) from random import SystemRandom randrange = SystemRandom().randrange # Generate a public/private key pair using the NIST Curve P-192: g = generator_192 n = g.order() secret = randrange( 1, n ) pubkey = Public_key( g, g * secret ) privkey = Private_key( pubkey, secret ) # Signing a hash value: hash = randrange( 1, n ) signature = privkey.sign( hash, randrange( 1, n ) ) # Verifying a signature for a hash value: if pubkey.verifies( hash, signature ): print_("Demo verification succeeded.") else: print_("*** Demo verification failed.") # Verification fails if the hash value is modified: if pubkey.verifies( hash-1, signature ): print_("**** Demo verification failed to reject tampered hash.") else: print_("Demo verification correctly rejected tampered hash.") Version of 2009.05.16. Revision history: 2005.12.31 - Initial version. 2008.11.25 - Substantial revisions introducing new classes. 2009.05.16 - Warn against using random.randrange in real applications. 2009.05.17 - Use random.SystemRandom by default. Written in 2005 by Peter Pearson and placed in the public domain. ) ellipticcurve) numbertheoryc eZdZy) RSZeroErrorN)__name__ __module__ __qualname__^/var/www/html/turnos/venv/lib/python3.12/site-packages/ccxt/static_dependencies/ecdsa/ecdsa.pyrr<sr rceZdZdZdZdZy) SignaturezECDSA signature. c.||_||_||_y)N)rsrecovery_param)selfrrrs r __init__zSignature.__init__Ds,r c|j}|j}|j}|j}|}|}t |d|j |j |zz|jz|j z} tj| |j } | dzdk(r| n|j | z } tj||| |} tj|||| z| |z|zzz} t|| }tj||| |}tj||||z| |z|zzz}t||}||gS)zReturns two public keys for which the signature is valid hash is signed hash generator is the used generator of the signature )curveorderrrpowpabrsquare_root_mod_primerPoint inverse_mod Public_key)rhash generatorrnrrexalphabetayR1Q1Pk1R2Q2Pk2s r recover_public_keyszSignature.recover_public_keysIsQ ! 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Return True if the signature is valid. rF)r$rrrrr!r5r') rr# signatureGr%rrcu1u2xyvs r verifieszPublic_key.verifies{s NN GGI KK KK q5AAI q5AAI  $ $Q *Qh!^!eq[ !Vb4::o % DDFQJAv r N)rrr r2rr@r r r r"r"gsK r r"ceZdZdZdZdZy) Private_keyzPrivate key for ECDSA. c ||_||_y)zQpublic_key is of class Public_key; secret_multiplier is a large integer. N) public_keysecret_multiplier)rrDrEs r rzPrivate_key.__init__s %!2r c|jj}|j}||z}||z}|j|z}|dk(r t dt j ||||j|z|zzz|z}|dk(r t d|jdzxs|j|k(rdnd} t||| S)aReturn a signature for the provided hash, using the provided random nonce. It is absolutely vital that random_k be an unpredictable number in the range [1, self.public_key.point.order()-1]. If an attacker can guess random_k, he can compute our private key from a single signature. Also, if an attacker knows a few high-order bits (or a few low-order bits) of random_k, he can compute our private key from many signatures. The generation of nonces with adequate cryptographic strength is very difficult and far beyond the scope of this comment. May raise RuntimeError, in which case retrying with a new random value k is in order. rz!amazingly unlucky random number rz!amazingly unlucky random number sr) rDr$rr'rrr!rEr*r) rr#random_kr:r%kp1rrrs r signzPrivate_key.signs OO % % GGI qL U DDFQJ 6AB B  % %a +d,,q0A557:; < 6AB B!@RTTVq[aA~..r N)rrr r2rrJr r r rBrBs3/r rBc|dk\sJ|dk(ryg}|r3|dz}|jtj|dd|dz}|r3|jdj |S)z7Convert integer x into a string of bytes, as per X9.62.rrbigr )appendintto_bytesreversejoin)r'resultordinals r int_to_stringrWsj 6M6Av F d( cll7Au56 a  NN 88F r c^d}|D]%}t|ts t|}d|z|z}'|S)z8Convert a string of bytes into an integer, as per X9.62.r) isinstancerQord)rrUr;s r string_to_intr\s> F "!S!AAv!" 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